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I have a question regarding Kant 's sources of metaphysical cognition.
Firstly, I'm not quite sure what he means by cognition in the first place, I don't see it clearly defined anywhere yet. Does he just mean "action of thinking about"?
he says (in ss1 of the prolegomena) that the sources of metaphysical cognition cannot be empirical.
now, he says the Principals of such cognition include fundamental propositions taken from beyond experience, but im not sure if these propositions are synonmomous with the source of such cognition or if they are a product of it.
so, what does he mean by source here?
I think he might be referring to the ability to cognisize and where it comes from, since he goes on to say that the (metaphysical) cognition is a priori and from pure understanding and reason, differentiating it from outer experience and inner "empirical psychology" (empirischen Psychologie).
now I have a problem with this too, mainly in how he assumed that one even has any form of intuitive reasoning outside of experience (yes it's a very fundamental doubt) he compared this "pure philosophical" cognition to Mathematical cognition and for further understanding referred to a section of the CPR.
in this section pure Mathematical cognition is said to cognisize through reason "from the construction of concepts" through "nonemperical intuition" that intuition being "an individual object" (this constructed concept being valid for all intuitions of the same concept, I dont doubt this universality but cant get myself to agree with his claim of nonempirical intuition)
to cement my doubt I find this to be the most ludicrous statement in the CPR (ill post all the passages my doubt refers to when I got on my computer)
>The shape of a cone will be able to be made intuitable without any empirical assistance at all, in accordance with the concept alone, but the colour of this cone will have to be given beforehand, in one or another experience.
I find that neither of those intuitions are possible, even the shape, without empirical assistance.
also, even if metaphysical cognition concerns itself with or bases itself on principles of things beyond experience how does that necessarily imply that the source of the cognition itself must be beyond experience?